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Abstract. This note gives a simple counterexample to back up Pottinger’s explanation of the 
difference between propositional logic, and the type theories of Pottinger (1 Y80) and Coppo- 
Dezani (1978). The example depends on a theorem of Ben-Yelles ( 1979). 
Several people in computer science have asked me whether the type-schemes for 
A-calculus that Coppo and Dezani introduced in [3] correspond to provable formulae 
in some propositional logic. The answer is “no”, and was given by Pottinger in [4] 
for his similar system. The present note backs up Pottinger’s answer with a specific 
counterexample based on a theorem of Ben-Yelles [2]. . 
1 shall use here the notation of [I]. Coppo-Dezani type schemes are given in [ 1, 
Definition 2. l] and the rules for assigning them to A -terms are given in [ 1, Definition 
2.51. The set of all type schemes which are assigned to closed A-terms will be 
Lalled S: 
S={U: (3 closed M)(td4j}. 
In the Curry system [.l, Section 11, the only type-forming connective is ‘-+‘, and 
S coincides with the set of all provable formulae of intuitionist implicational logic. 
Coppo-Dezani type schemes use ‘n’ (intersection) as well as ‘-+I The introduction 
and elimination rules for ‘n’ are very like those for ‘A’ (conjunction) in logic, and 
it is tempting to think that S becomes the set of provable formulae of some system 
of logic when ‘n‘ is interpreted as ‘A ‘. 
This is not the case. The reason was stated by Pottinger in [4, p. 5611: In the 
Coppo-Dezani n-introduction rule, 
crM,?M t- (m-v)M, 
M is the same in the conclusion as in both premises (and indeed must be so, if ‘n’ 
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is to represent intersection). Thus AZ doec; not grow as the deduction grows, and 
so A-terms do not correspond to deductions, as they do in the Curry system. 
The following example backs up Pottinger’s remark. 
Example. Let a, b, c be distinct type-variables, and define 
a=((a+a)n((a+.b+c)+(a+b.+.a+c))). 
The corresponding propositional formula ( with ’ A ’ for . c j ‘) is provable in intuitionistic 
logic. ma’ in most other logics too. But ati §. 
Proof. Ben-Yelles [2, Theorem 4.491 says that, for the Curry system, if 
t-(a+a)M, (1) 
then A4 =/rl Ax.x, itnd if 
C(Ia-*.h-*c)-,(a-,h.g.a-,c))M, (2) 
then M = fi hxyz.xz( yz). Now let OM be provable in the Coppo-Dezani system. 
Then by the n-elimination rule, (1) and (2) hold in that system. By the conservative- 
extension theorem [ 1, Corollary 4.101, they hold for the Curry system too. Hetlce 
,V has two normal forms, which is impossible. 
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